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ABSTRACT—As the United States grapples with how best to manage a
global pandemic, bankruptcy courts are bracing for the inevitable fallout
from COVID-19. As we saw in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, hardhit businesses will need to reorganize to adjust to new conditions, while outof-work consumers will need debt relief options. But there will be a new
twist for this impending wave of bankruptcies: how should bankruptcy courts
deal with crypto assets like Bitcoin? This Essay argues that the rise of
cryptocurrency investments over the last decade poses serious complications
for the next round of consumer and business bankruptcies. Although
legislative solutions may be necessary to adequately address these
complications, at the very least, greater awareness of these issues will help
ensure that courts and stakeholders are better prepared to address this
looming crisis.
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INTRODUCTION
Though cryptocurrency is a relatively recent phenomenon, the
academic literature is already replete with attempts to quantify the radical
ways in which this new form of asset will uproot society.1 Bankruptcy is one
area that is beginning to bear out these predictions, as courts respond to new
and complex questions relating to assets, liabilities, and contractual
obligations involving cryptocurrencies.2 Outside of the bankruptcy context,

1
See, e.g., Asress Adimi Gikay, Regulating Decentralized Cryptocurrencies Under Payment
Services Law: Lessons from European Union Law, 9 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 2 (2018)
(“The only constant is the fast evolution of cryptocurrencies and businesses centered on them and the
lack of robust legal framework regulating them in many areas.”); Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T.
Middlebrook, Advancing a Framework for Regulating Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries,
32 YALE J. ON REG. 495, 495 (2015) (arguing that “the operation of wallets and exchanges requires a new
commercial law that lays out rights and liabilities of cryptocurrency users in a robust and transparent
fashion”); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV.
1, 6 (2016) (explaining the potential effects on poverty in the developing world if the blockchain proves
to be “that holy grail of commerce—a payments system that would eliminate or minimize the roles of
third party intermediaries”); Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency
Regulation in the Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271, 274 (2015) (noting “the unique challenges that
face policymakers in creating a consistent, cohesive, and appropriately-scaled legal and regulatory
framework for virtual currencies”); Lance Koonce, The Wild, Distributed World: Get Ready for Radical
Infrastructure Changes, from Blockchains to the Interplanetary File System to the Internet of Things,
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (May 13, 2016), https://www.dwt.com/the-wild-distributed-world-getready-for-radical-infrastructure-changes-from-blockchains-to-the-interplanetary-file-system-to-theinternet-of-things-05-13-2016 [https://perma.cc/WH33-RJBP] (predicting that the advent of blockchain
“means that a wide range of industries stands to be disrupted and reinvented, and that the winds of change
are going to blow in from every quadrant”).
2
See, e.g., Devika Krishna Kumar, Mt. Gox Founder Won’t Appear in U.S. for Questions About
Bankruptcy Case, REUTERS (Apr. 14, 2014, 9:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bitcoinmtgox/mt-gox-founder-wont-appear-in-u-s-for-questions-about-bankruptcy-caseidUSBREA3E02S20140415 [https://perma.cc/QNT4-DUN4] (discussing developments in In re Mt. Gox
Co., Ch. 15 No. 14-31229-sgj15 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014) (Chapter 15 filing for the Japanese Bitcoin
exchange that lost $500 million to hackers)); Robin Sidel & Katy Stech, Bitcoin Firm Files for
Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 2013, 7:04 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoin-firm-files-forbankruptcy-1383609802 [https://perma.cc/ZY4P-BXVM] (discussing developments in In re CLI
Holdings, Inc., Ch. 11 No. 13-19746-KAO (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013) (Chapter 11 filing of a business
that was contractually obligated to mine and deliver Bitcoins to a counterparty)).
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regulators have endeavored to design frameworks to address this new form
of asset.3 However, so far, bankruptcy courts have yet to forge a clear
framework for dealing with crypto assets.4
This Essay argues that a cogent and comprehensive approach to
managing crypto assets5 in bankruptcy proceedings will be critical in the
coming years as these assets will likely play an increasingly significant role
in the bankruptcies of the future.6 The unique features of crypto assets also
pose unique challenges for liquidations and reorganizations, including a
heightened risk that debtors will use crypto holdings to shield assets from
creditors; valuation problems that arise during liquidation or reorganization;
the possibility that stakeholders may use bankruptcy opportunistically to
exploit the value fluctuations in crypto-collateral;7 and questions about
courts’ authority to issue and enforce binding decisions involving digital
assets that defy traditional jurisdictional frameworks.8

3

See generally Stephanie A. Lemchuk, Virtual Whats?: Defining Virtual Currencies in the Face of
Conflicting Regulatory Guidances, 15 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 319 (2017); Tara Mandjee,
Bitcoin, Its Legal Classification and Its Regulatory Framework, 15 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 157, 182 (2015)
(arguing for three main approaches to effective government oversight: “A) measures to prevent financial
crimes, B) taxation, and C) consumer protection, including data security issues”).
4
See, e.g., Jhanile T. Smith, Bitcoin Exchanges in Bankruptcy: The Square Peg in the Round Hole,
35 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2016, at 46–47 (identifying several unanswered questions arising from
bankruptcies of crypto exchanges such as Mt. Gox); see also Adam J. Levitin, Pandora’s Digital Box:
The Promise and Perils of Digital Wallets, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 305, 311–12 (2018) (noting that courts are
just beginning to grapple with the issues surrounding digital payment systems).
5
To avoid the suggestion that Bitcoin or other digital “currencies” resemble fiat currency, this Essay
uses the terms “crypto assets,” “crypto holdings,” or “digital assets” instead of “cryptocurrency.”
6
See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Reliable Perfection of Security Interests in Crypto-Currency, 21 SMU
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 159, 159 (2018) (“[A]ll signs suggest that, in the years to come, investments in one
or another form of crypto-currency will become more routine and more substantial.”).
7
Increasing numbers of lenders are recognizing crypto holdings as possible collateral for loans. See
generally Ashlyn L. Robinson, Crypto-Collateral? Securing Loans with Digital Currency, LAW.COM
(Mar. 21, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/2019/03/21/crypto-collateral-securingloans-with-digital-currency/?slreturn=20200014102547 [https://perma.cc/8PA4-UHV7] (examining the
question of whether lenders should accept crypto assets as collateral for loans).
8
For the purposes of this Essay, I am setting aside a fourth, overarching problem: the issue of in rem
jurisdiction for crypto assets. Some have argued that in rem jurisdiction should be tied to the location of
the server on which transactional data is stored. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, 19 N.C.
L. REV. 1643, 1676 (2012) (arguing in the context of probate law that states lack jurisdiction over the
disposition of online social media accounts unless the servers are located in-state). Others have suggested
that new jurisdictional frameworks may be necessary for digital assets. See, e.g., Howard Seife, CrossBorder Professionals Respond to Chapter 15 Proposals, 38 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2019, at 8 (“Given
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This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I explains why the undefined
nature of crypto assets creates confusion and uncertainty for stakeholders in
the bankruptcy process. Part II sketches out the unique features of crypto
assets that pose the greatest challenges for bankruptcy and insolvency
systems, highlighting cases where these features have already played a
disruptive role. Part III concludes with a call to action, arguing that a laissezfaire attitude would be detrimental to the orderly development of the market
for crypto assets, and possibly to the U.S. bankruptcy system as a whole.
I.

WHAT IS A CRYPTO ASSET AND WHY DOES IT MATTER FOR
BANKRUPTCY?

Debates surrounding the proper legal characterization of crypto assets
like Bitcoin have been a boon for the legal academy, the source of a
seemingly endless stream of articles, notes, and comments over the past
decade.9 Rather than summarizing the useful histories of regulatory efforts
at the local, federal, and international levels provided by other scholars, this
Essay will merely note that existing regulatory efforts—while substantial—
nonetheless fall short of answering a critical question: What is a crypto
asset?10
Meanwhile, bankruptcy courts have not even attempted to answer the
question of what a crypto asset is. This Part argues that developing a clear
answer to the question will be essential to the stakeholders in a bankruptcy
that involves crypto assets. Not only does an answer give parties more clarity
for the purposes of ex ante bargaining, but a definite framework would have
the added benefit of making insolvency proceedings more efficient because

recent technological advances and the ‘virtual’ nature of certain businesses, a company incorporated in
an offshore jurisdiction may not have a physical place of operations or otherwise engage in traditional
business activities in its place of incorporation, thereby creating certain challenges for recognition of
offshore foreign proceedings.”).
9
See, e.g., Evan Hewitt, Bringing Continuity to Cryptocurrency: Commercial Law as a Guide to the
Asset Categorization of Bitcoin, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 619 (2016) (surveying various federal and state
approaches to regulation and proposing a new asset type: “electronic pseudo-currency”); Lemchuk, supra
note 3, at 341–50 (surveying various approaches to domestic regulation and concluding that regulation as
a commodity is most appropriate); Mandjee, supra note 3, at 182 (surveying domestic and international
efforts to regulate Bitcoin); Mann, supra note 6, at 160–63 (discussing IRS, SEC, and Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) developments).
10
See, e.g., Mandjee, supra note 3, at 164–66 (describing the disagreements among regulators and
courts about how to classify crypto assets such as Bitcoin); Mann, supra note 6, at 160–63 (explaining
that crypto assets do not fit squarely into any existing framework and should therefore be considered
“general intangibles” for the purposes of the UCC).
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stakeholders would have more certainty about the outcome.11 Section I.A
begins by giving a brief overview of the U.S. bankruptcy system in order to
introduce some of the key stakeholders and procedural mechanisms
discussed in this Essay. Section I.B then examines a bankruptcy case that
identified but did not resolve several critical issues surrounding the nature of
crypto assets. The Section concludes by arguing that the ongoing lack of
clarity surrounding these issues suggests that legislative intervention may be
necessary.
A. A Brief Overview of the U.S. Bankruptcy System
This Section briefly introduces some of the key concepts and
stakeholders in the United States bankruptcy system, in order to provide
nonspecialist readers with some context for the common issues likely to arise
with crypto assets. There are four types of bankruptcy discussed in this
Essay: Chapter 7 liquidations for consumers and businesses,12 Chapter 13
payment plans for consumers,13 Chapter 11 for business reorganizations,14
and Chapter 15 for cross-border cases.15 The person or entity filing for
bankruptcy is the “debtor,”16 and the debtor initiates the bankruptcy process

11
See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Osterman & Debra A. Dandeneau, Bankruptcy and Modern Technology
Transactions: An Old Bottle for New Wine, 25 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 181, 197 (2016)
(“[M]ismatches between bankruptcy law and current practices . . . divert time and attention during
negotiation of deals, and all-to-often leave clients still uncertain as to the extent to which they will be
protected in the future.”).
12
11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2012) (eligibility for Chapter 7); id. §§ 701–27 (procedures specific to
Chapter 7). Chapter 7 also prescribes more detailed procedures for a variety of specific types of
liquidations, including stockbroker liquidation provisions, id. §§ 741–53, and commodity broker
liquidation provisions, id. §§ 761–67. These subcategories of Chapter 7 might be implicated in a
liquidation of a crypto exchange. However, as explained in Section I.B, the indeterminate nature of crypto
assets creates challenges for predicting which, if any, of these procedures might apply in the event that a
domestic crypto exchange files for bankruptcy.
13
Id. § 109(e) (eligibility for Chapter 13); id. §§ 1301–30 (procedures specific to Chapter 13).
14
Id. § 109(d) (eligibility for Chapter 11); id. §§ 1101–46 (procedures specific to Chapter 11).
Individuals can also use Chapter 11 to reorganize. This use is most common for high-net-worth
individuals who are not eligible for Chapter 7 or individuals with high debts who are not eligible for
Chapter 13. This Essay refers briefly to the bankruptcy of the rap mogul Curtis James Jackson (also
known as 50 Cent), who filed a Chapter 11 petition. See Zack Guzman, 50 Cent Files for Bankruptcy,
CNBC (July 13, 2015, 11:17 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/13/50-cent-files-for-bankruptcy.html
[https://perma.cc/3272-NDNN].
15
11 U.S.C § 1501 (purpose of Chapter 15); id. §§ 1502–32 (procedures specific to Chapter 15).
16
Id. § 101(13) (defining “debtor”).
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by filing a petition,17 which is followed by detailed schedules that include
lists of the debtor’s assets and liabilities.18
A Chapter 7 bankruptcy is a relatively quick and streamlined process.19
For a business, a Chapter 7 filing means that the business is dissolving and
using the bankruptcy to make an orderly distribution of its assets to the
business’s creditors.20 For an individual consumer, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
allows the debtor to liquidate nonexempt assets for distribution to creditors.21
Although debtors can use exemptions to shield some assets from liquidation22
(such as a home or a car, at least up to a certain dollar value),23 crypto assets
are not covered by most exemptions and would therefore usually be
liquidated in order to pay creditors.24 Following this liquidation, the debtor
receives a discharge which covers most types of unsecured consumer debts.25
A key stakeholder in either type of Chapter 7 bankruptcy is the trustee,
a private attorney who is appointed by the court to represent the collective

17

See id. § 301(a) (setting forth the method of commencing a voluntary bankruptcy case).
See id. § 521 (describing the schedules that a debtor must file after commencing a case).
19
See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of Local
Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 801, 815 (1994) (contrasting a consumer Chapter 7 bankruptcy, which “is typically completed in
less than six months,” with the longer and more cumbersome Chapter 13 process).
20
See David S. Kupetz, Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors: Effective Tool for Acquiring and
Winding Up Distressed Businesses, BUS. L. TODAY, Nov. 2015, at 1–2 (explaining that for distressed
businesses that are winding down operations, Chapter 7 “provides a procedure for the orderly liquidation
of the assets of the debtor and the ultimate payment of creditors in the order of priority set forth in the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code”).
21
See Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer Bankruptcy’s Greatest Weakness
May Account for Its Surprising Success, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1943 (2011) (“In theory, the
‘deal’ provided by Chapter 7 is that the debtor will surrender all nonexempt assets and, in exchange, will
receive a ‘fresh start,’ free of most unsecured debt.”).
22
See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (process for claiming exemptions under either federal or state law).
23
See id. § 522(d)(1) (setting forth a federal exemption of up to $15,000 for equity in real property);
id. § 522(d)(2) (setting forth a federal exemption of up to $2,400 of value in a motor vehicle). These
federal dollar limits are adjusted every three years. See id. § 104(a).
24
The federal exemptions include a “wild card exemption” that can be applied to any asset, up to a
certain dollar value. See id. § 522(d)(5) (allowing a debtor who is using the federal exemptions to
designate as exempt up to $800 in any property, plus up to $7,500 of any unused portion of the real
property exemption in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1)). If eligible for a wildcard exemption, a debtor could have
a way to shield at least some crypto assets from liquidation.
25
See id. § 727 (describing the discharge process). Several types of debt are nondischargeable. See
id. § 523. Common examples of nondischargeable debt include domestic support obligations, most taxes,
and student loans. The latter category is only dischargeable upon a showing of “undue hardship.” See id.
§ 523(a)(8).
18
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interests of the creditors.26 The trustee’s primary goal is to identify
nonexempt assets that are available for liquidation, for the benefit of
creditors, and then sell them.27 Because crypto assets are not generally
exempt, a trustee can be expected to liquidate any crypto assets that a debtor
has disclosed in her schedules.28
Chapter 7 trustees also have various mechanisms at their disposal to
help them recover assets that a business or consumer debtor may have
transferred in the months, and sometimes years, leading up to bankruptcy.29
These mechanisms are generally referred to as the trustee’s avoiding
powers.30 Finally, the Chapter 7 trustee is also tasked with determining
whether a debtor has properly disclosed all assets, including crypto assets,
and conducting further investigation if there are doubts about whether a
debtor has made a complete and accurate disclosure.31 A debtor who fails to
completely and accurately fill out the required schedules can be denied a
discharge.32 The denial of a discharge then renders nondischargeable all of
the debt that could have been discharged in the Chapter 7 bankruptcy.33 Thus,
a debtor’s failure to accurately disclose crypto assets in the bankruptcy
schedules could make the debtor worse off than if the debtor had never filed
for bankruptcy at all.
Chapter 13 bankruptcy is also an option for consumers, but it operates
differently from Chapter 7 liquidations.34 In Chapter 13, a debtor develops a
long-term35 payment plan and commits a portion of his or her future wages

26
Id. § 701 (provisions for appointment of trustee in Chapter 7); id. § 704 (duties of Chapter 7
trustee).
27
See id. § 704(a)(1).
28
See supra text accompanying notes 21–24.
29
11 U.S.C. §§ 544–50.
30
See generally Richard B. Levin, An Introduction to the Trustee’s Avoiding Powers, 53 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 173 (1979) (providing an overview of the tools available to the trustee under the Bankruptcy
Code).
31
See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(4); see also id. §§ 341(d), 343 (requiring the trustee to examine the debtor
under oath and permitting other stakeholders to conduct an examination as well). An additional
stakeholder, known colloquially as the U.S. Trustee’s Office, also plays a broader oversight role in the
bankruptcy process and provides an added layer of fraud detection. 28 U.S.C. § 586 (2012).
32
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1)–(5).
33
Id. § 523(a)(10).
34
Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 19, at 814–17 (explaining the “different legal bargain”
made by Chapter 13 debtors).
35
The Chapter 13 payment plan will either be three years or five years depending on debtor
characteristics that are not significant here. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4).
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toward the plan.36 After the plan is confirmed and fully executed, the debtor
receives a discharge of most of the remaining unsecured consumer debts.37
Unlike a Chapter 7 debtor, who must give up nonexempt assets, the Chapter
13 debtor can typically opt to keep his or her assets.38 Thus, a Chapter 13
debtor could ordinarily file for bankruptcy without putting crypto assets at
risk. However, Chapter 13 becomes significant for debtors that have used
their crypto assets as security for loans, because a Chapter 13 debtor can ask
the court to reduce or eliminate the liens that a secured creditor has on the
debtor’s assets.39 The possibility that debtors will use these lien-stripping
provisions opportunistically will be discussed in Section II.C.
The two remaining types of bankruptcies are discussed only briefly in
this Essay and will be given similarly brief treatment here. Chapter 11
reorganization is used primarily (but not exclusively) by businesses40 and
involves both a plan41 and a discharge from remaining debt.42 Unlike a
Chapter 13 debtor, who is expected to complete plan payments before
receiving a discharge,43 the Chapter 11 debtor obtains a discharge of
remaining debt as soon as the plan is confirmed.44 Chapter 11 gives debtors
a variety of tools to implement an effective reorganization,45 including
modifying liens.46 In addition, most Chapter 11 cases allow the debtor to
exercise the same rights to recover assets as the trustee exercises in a Chapter
7 case.47 Finally, Chapter 15 involves cross-border insolvencies for entities

36

Id. § 1322(a)(1).
Id. § 1328(a). Debtors who have not completed their plan payments “due to circumstances for
which the debtor should not justly be held accountable” may be eligible for a hardship discharge. Id.
§ 1328(b)(1). Chapter 13 discharges are also subject to most, but not all, of the nondischargeability
provisions discussed in note 25. Compare id. § 1328(a)(1)–(4), with id. § 523.
38
Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 19, at 814 (explaining that Chapter 13 “debtors keep
all their property in return for an agreement to pay their trustees” a portion of their future income).
39
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).
40
See supra note 14.
41
11 U.S.C. §§ 1121–29 (describing the procedures for preparing and confirming a Chapter 11 plan).
42
Id. § 1141(d).
43
Id. § 1328(a).
44
Id. § 1141(d)(1)(A).
45
See id. § 1123(a)(5).
46
Id. § 1123(a)(5)(E). Lien modification is generally subject to creditor approval, see id. § 1126, but
may be authorized even over the objections of the affected lienholder under certain circumstances, known
as cram-down. See generally Charles J. Tabb, Credit Bidding, Security, and the Obsolescence of Chapter
11, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 103, 113 (explaining how the cram-down process affects secured lenders).
47
See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (defining “debtor in possession”); id. § 1107(a) (giving the debtor in
possession most of the same rights as a trustee).
37
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that need to resolve issues surrounding assets and liabilities in various
jurisdictions with different insolvency systems. Typically, a debtor will file
its main proceeding in the locale where its main business operates,48 and then
open ancillary proceedings in other locales,49 with the expectation that those
ancillary fora will defer to the decisions made in the main proceeding.50
B. In re HashFast Technologies LLC: A Missed Opportunity?
This Section examines an early opportunity for the bankruptcy system
to at least start developing an analytical framework. This opportunity arose
six years ago during a corporate liquidation filed in the Northern District of
California: In re HashFast Technologies LLC.51 HashFast, a Bitcoin mining
technology company, had pioneered a technology that purported to allow
Bitcoin miners to outpace their competitors.52 HashFast enlisted the help of
Dr. Marc Lowe, an early proponent of Bitcoin who had a large online
following, to help market the technology.53 In exchange for his assistance,
HashFast promised to pay Dr. Lowe 10% of the proceeds of the first set of
sales, which amounted to $308,000.54 But instead of paying this commission
in U.S. currency, HashFast paid Dr. Lowe using 3,000 bitcoins.55 When
HashFast later found itself in bankruptcy court,56 the Chapter 11 trustee

48

See id. § 1502(4) (defining a “foreign main proceeding”).
See id. § 1502(5) (defining a “foreign nonmain proceeding”).
50
See id. §§ 1515–21 (describing the process for obtaining recognition of the outcome of a foreign
main proceeding).
51
In re HashFast Techs. LLC, Ch. 11 No. 14-30725 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2014).
52
See Declaration of Defendant in Opposition to Partial Summary Judgment, ¶¶ 5–12, Kasolas v.
Lowe (In re HashFast Techs. LLC), Ch. 11 Case No. 14-30725, Adv. No. 15-03011 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
Feb. 5, 2016).
53
See id.
54
Brief in Opposition to Partial Summary Judgment at 3, Kasolas v. Lowe (In re HashFast Techs.
LLC), Ch. 11 Case No. 14-30725, Adv. No. 15-03011 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016).
55
Id. at 3–4.
56
HashFast was initially the subject of a petition for involuntary bankruptcy under Chapter 7. See
Involuntary Petition filed by creditors Koi Systems, UBE Enterprises, Timothy Lam, Edward Hammond,
Grant Pederson, In re HashFast Techs. LLC, Ch. 7 No. 14-30725 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 9, 2014). The
debtor successfully converted the case to a voluntary Chapter 11 reorganization. See Motion to Convert
to Chapter 11, In re HashFast Techs. LLC, Ch. 7 No. 14-30725 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. June 3, 2014); Order
Granting Motion to Convert to Chapter 11, In re HashFast Techs. LLC, Ch. 7 No. 14-30725 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. June 4, 2014). Eventually, the bankruptcy court approved HashFast’s Chapter 11 liquidation plan
and appointed Michael Kasolas as the liquidation trustee. See Order Approving on a Final Basis and
Confirming the Consolidated Plan of Liquidation, In re HashFast Techs. LLC, Ch. 11 No. 14-30725
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. June 25, 2015).
49
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charged with liquidating HashFast sought to avoid, or undo, the payment as
a fraudulent transfer.57 By that time, Dr. Lowe’s 3,000 bitcoins had more than
tripled in value to over $1 million. Accordingly, the trustee sought to use the
tools available in the bankruptcy code to recover either the Bitcoin itself, or
the current value of the Bitcoin.58 In opposing the trustee’s avoidance action,
Dr. Lowe asked the bankruptcy court to treat the Bitcoin as currency, thereby
limiting the trustee’s recovery to a maximum of approximately $300,000.59
During the summary judgment briefing, both parties harnessed
available case law and regulatory frameworks to support their competing
positions. Specifically, the trustee argued that Bitcoin should be treated as “a
commodity, like gold, silver or pork bellies, that fluctuates in price based
upon market conditions.”60 As supporting authority, the trustee cited a
September 17, 2015, order from the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) requiring that virtual currencies be regulated under the
Commodities Exchange Act.61 The trustee argued that his position was
further supported by 2014 IRS guidance, which stated that Bitcoin would be
treated as property for the purpose of capital gains tax.62
Meanwhile, to oppose the trustee’s motion, Dr. Lowe cited the Treasury
Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which had
issued the first federal guidance regarding cryptocurrency in early 2013.63
FinCEN had advised that because cryptocurrency mainly behaves like
regular currency, it should be regulated as such.64 Dr. Lowe also pointed out

57

HashFast originally filed the motion to avoid the payment in its capacity as debtor in possession.
See Adversary Complaint, HashFast v. Lowe (In re HashFast Techs. LLC), Ch. 11 No. 14-30725 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2015). After HashFast’s liquidation plan was confirmed, the liquidation trustee took
over this adversary proceeding. See Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1, HashFast v. Lowe (In re
HashFast Techs. LLC), Ch. 11 Case No. 14-30725, Adv. No. 15-03011 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2016).
58
Under the trustee’s avoiding powers, discussed in supra note 17 and surrounding text, the trustee
typically has the option of recovering either the value of property or the property itself, depending on
which option is more beneficial to creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 550 (2012).
59
Brief in Opposition to Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 54, at 14.
60
Brief in Support of Partial Summary Judgment at 2, Kasolas v. Lowe (In re HashFast Techs. LLC),
Ch. 11 No. 14-30725, Adv. No. 15-03011 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2016).
61
Id. at 4–5.
62
Id. at 5.
63
Brief in Opposition to Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 54, at 5.
64
See Dep’t of the Treasury, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to
Virtual Currency Mining Operations (Jan. 30, 2014), https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-
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that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau had described Bitcoin as “a
kind of electronic money” in guidance issued in August 2014.65 Finally, Dr.
Lowe argued that court briefs filed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in a separate case, along with various court opinions in
money laundering cases involving crypto assets, lent further authority to the
view that Bitcoin should be treated the same way as currency.66
With such a well-briefed motion, the HashFast case presented a prime
opportunity for the bankruptcy court to take a critical first step toward
developing a working approach to crypto assets in bankruptcy. Instead, the
court only addressed Dr. Lowe’s argument that crypto assets should be
treated as the equivalent of U.S. dollars.67 In a terse, two-page order rejecting
this aspect of Dr. Lowe’s argument, the court stated that there was no need
to go beyond this narrow ruling because the trustee had not yet established
his claim for avoidance.68 After determining that Bitcoin was not the
equivalent of U.S. currency, the court deferred further consideration of what
exactly Bitcoin was, and what the trustee’s rights to the Bitcoin might be.
The court explained that it was unnecessary to address these further issues
until the trustee had first established that HashFast’s transfer was
fraudulent.69

regulations/administrative-rulings/application-fincens-regulations-virtual-0
[https://perma.cc/4NL758YN] (“[FinCEN’s] guidance makes clear that an administrator or exchanger of convertible virtual
currencies that (1) accepts and transmits a convertible virtual currency or (2) buys or sells convertible
virtual currency in exchange for currency of legal tender or another convertible virtual currency for any
reason (including when intermediating between a user and a seller of goods or services the user is
purchasing on the user’s behalf) is a money transmitter under FinCEN’s regulations . . . .”).
65
Brief in Opposition to Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 54, at 6; see also CONSUMER FIN.
PROT. BUREAU, RISKS TO CONSUMERS POSED BY VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2014),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201408_cfpb_consumer-advisory_virtual-currencies.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PG5Q-AJA3].
66
Brief in Opposition to Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 54, at 5–6 (pointing to the
government’s argument in another case that Bitcoin should be treated as money for the purposes of the
SEC’s enforcement action against a Ponzi scheme); see also id. at 8 (citing the court’s prior holding that
Bitcoin was a “decentralized digital currency”); id. at 7–8 (citing the holding that Bitcoin was a monetary
instrument for the purposes of the federal money laundering statutes because holding otherwise would
“be nonsensical”).
67
Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1, HashFast v. Lowe, (In re HashFast Techs.
LLC), Ch. 11 No. 14-30725, Adv. No. 15-03011 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2016).
68
Id. at 1–2.
69
Id. at 2.
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That day never came because the parties opted to settle rather than
continue to litigate over an uncertain benefit or loss.70 Indeed, even four years
later, these issues remain largely uncharted territory for bankruptcy courts.
This lack of clarity over the nature of crypto assets and a trustee’s recovery
rights risks leaving the bankruptcy system in limbo because trustees are
unable to meaningfully evaluate whether to pursue avoidance actions in
situations when a crypto asset has dramatically increased in value after
leaving a debtor’s hands. Although the payoff from a successful avoidance
action would be significant, both for the trustee and for creditors, trustees
must balance the possibility of a large recovery (which would likely be
appealed) against the risk of walking away with nothing to show for their
litigation efforts. At this point, congressional intervention may be the
likeliest way to obtain clarity regarding these issues.
II. CRYPTO ASSETS ARE NOT LIKE ANY OTHER ASSETS
As Part I illustrates, no clear framework has yet emerged for how to
characterize crypto assets in bankruptcy. This Part argues that efforts to force
crypto assets into an existing category or framework is not an ideal solution
because existing frameworks are inadequate to address the unique challenges
that these digital assets pose to bankruptcy and insolvency systems. There
are four features that make these assets particularly challenging. First, crypto
assets are typically bought and sold through pseudonymous71 transactions,
which pose challenges for determining ownership as well as obtaining key
details regarding transfers. Second, crypto assets that are traded on
exchanges72 present a false facade of liquidity, which adds a potentially
unexpected layer of complexity to court-ordered asset sales. Third, crypto
assets are highly volatile, which creates a heightened risk of opportunistic
behavior. Fourth, to the extent that crypto assets are digital constructions that
exist “on the cloud” rather than in physical form, these assets defy traditional
jurisdictional characterizations. Each of these features is described in more
detail below.

70
See Stipulation to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding with Prejudice, Kasolas v. Lowe, (In re HashFast
Techs. LLC), Ch. 11 No. 14-30725, Adv. No. 15-03011 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. June 17, 2016).
71
”Pseudonymous” may be a better term than “anonymous,” because although the blockchain does
not reveal the name of a buyer or seller, the blockchain does retain other identifying information. See
Nathaniel Popper, DIGITAL GOLD: BITCOIN AND THE INSIDE STORY OF THE MISFITS AND MILLIONAIRES
TRYING TO REINVENT MONEY 84 (2015).
72
See infra text accompanying notes 131–135.
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A. Opportunities for Anonymous Transactions
Crypto assets allow for a greater level of anonymity than ordinary
assets, at least in theory.73 Although the names of the purchasers and sellers
of crypto assets are generally not associated with specific transactions, the
blockchain stores other identifying information about each transaction.74 To
understand this aspect of crypto assets, it is helpful to consider the context
for the creation of one of the most prominent crypto assets: Bitcoin. Bitcoin
was born out of an economic libertarianism that skirted the boundaries of
anarchy,75 motivated in large part by the desire to create a means of storing
and transferring wealth that would be less easily tracked and controlled by
centralized authorities.76 Indeed, it is no coincidence that Bitcoin’s early
prominence paralleled the development of Silk Road, a website that enabled
all manner of illicit transactions, from drug deals to human trafficking.77 The
developer of Silk Road, Ross Ulbricht, recognized early on that Bitcoin
solved a critical problem for those seeking to use the internet for illegal
transactions.78 While other types of electronic payment systems required
buyers and sellers to use their names, the pseudonymous nature of
blockchain technology enabled buyers and sellers to transact business with
nothing more than a post office box.79

73
See Popper, supra note 71, at 84 (“Bitcoin was actually less anonymous than most people believed,
owing to the record of all transactions on the blockchain.”). Other crypto assets promise greater levels of
anonymity than Bitcoin. See Mandjee, supra note 3, at 163–64 (describing Darkcoin, a Bitcoin alternative
that offers “increased anonymity”).
74
See generally Popper, supra note 71 (providing an in-depth story of Bitcoin and how digital
currencies work).
75
See id. at 110–12 (describing Bitcoin’s well-timed introduction against the backdrop of Occupy
Wall Street).
76
See Nathaniel Rich, Ponzi Schemes, Private Yachts, and a Missing $250 Million in Crypto: The
Strange Tale of Quadriga, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/11/thestrange-tale-of-quadriga-gerald-cotten [https://perma.cc/C743-36WR] (explaining that Canada’s leading
crypto exchange, Quadriga, “trade[d] tens of millions of dollars worth of Bitcoin with accounts connected
to known Ponzi schemes and illegal marketplaces”); see also Mandjee, supra note 3, at 183 (“[G]iven the
potential abuse of virtual currencies and the increasing recognition that they were used to facilitate illicit
transactions and to launder criminal proceeds . . . FinCEN provided guidelines on ‘virtual currencies,’
subjecting them to the regulations applicable to money transmitters.”).
77
See Popper, supra note 71, at 167 (“[As of 2012,] the most successful entrepreneur in the Bitcoin
world was . . . Ross Ulbricht, the operator of the world’s largest drug bazaar.”); id. at 119 (noting that the
Silk Road “provid[ed] a good showcase for how anonymous markets and decentralized currencies could
work in practice”); see also Margaret Ryznar, The Future of Bitcoin Futures, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 539, 554
(2019) (“[B]itcoin’s background [is] an anonymous cryptocurrency for criminals.”).
78
See Popper, supra note 71, at 71.
79
Id.
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Similarly, it is probably no coincidence that Bitcoin’s value dropped
more than 20% in the two hours following the FBI’s bust of Silk Road.80 In
the panicked words of one Bitcoin forum poster: “I just hope that mainstream
adoption has surpassed the adoption of criminals and drug dealers. LOL!
Otherwise its [sic] time to SELL! SELL! SELL!”81 Although mainstream
adoption did ultimately keep Bitcoin values high (thanks to opportunistic
investors who had been looking for the right moment to buy),82 the Silk Road
saga highlights the ways in which the relative anonymity of crypto assets can
facilitate illegal activity.83
Tax authorities have begun to recognize the challenges posed by crypto
assets that lack easy traceability, particularly the risk that these assets will be
used to shield wealth from taxation.84 Although international consensus
about how to properly tax cryptocurrencies appears to be a distant prospect,85
domestically, the tax issues are much clearer. In 2014, the IRS opted to treat
Bitcoin as property for the purposes of calculating capital gains and gross
income.86 Perhaps in an attempt to induce voluntary compliance with its
newly announced stance, the IRS also created a safe harbor that would allow
Bitcoin investors to pay back taxes without penalty.87 Investors who had
reasonable cause for not previously paying taxes on Bitcoin had the
opportunity to pay back their taxes to the IRS, but those who failed to take

80
Bitcoin Value Drops After FBI Shuts Silk Road Drugs Site, BBC (Oct. 3, 2013),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-24381847 [https://perma.cc/Y6C9-2993] (“The going rate for the
virtual currency dropped from more than $140 . . . to around $110 . . . .”).
81
See Popper, supra note 71, at 250 (noting that the market price of Bitcoin dropped from $140 to
$110 within two hours of the FBI’s seizure of the Silk Road website).
82
See id. at 250–51 (explaining that a “surge of buying” from investors including the Winklevoss
twins helped Bitcoin to rebound within a few days).
83
Despite Ulbricht’s efforts to remain anonymous, he was eventually apprehended at a local branch
of the San Francisco Public Library while using their free Wi-Fi to log into his Silk Road account. See
Popper, supra note 71, at 246–48. During his subsequent criminal trial, Ulbricht argued that he could not
be convicted of money laundering because Bitcoin was not a “monetary instrument[]” for the purposes
of federal law. See United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The district court
rejected this argument as “nonsensical,” reasoning that “the only value for Bitcoin lies in its ability to pay
for things.” Id. at 570. Dr. Lowe subsequently cited this decision in his effort to convince the bankruptcy
court that his Bitcoin was the equivalent of U.S. currency. See supra notes 27–40 and accompanying text.
84
See Mandjee, supra note 3, at 187–88.
85
See id. at 189–92 (comparing the IRS’s treatment of Bitcoin as property in the United States with
the treatment of Bitcoin in the tax systems of Canada, Singapore, Germany, and the U.K.).
86
See id. at 189.
87
See id. at 189–90 (indicating that IRS rules provide penalty relief for persons who can prove
reasonable cause for non-filing).
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advantage of this safe harbor were warned that they were “open[ing]
themselves to penalties, interest and possible fraud prosecution.”88 Then, in
late 2019, the IRS added a question to Schedule 1 of its tax forms, asking
filers whether “[a]t any time during 2019, did you receive, sell, send,
exchange, or otherwise acquire any financial interest in any virtual
currency?”89 Likewise, some state regulators have also taken steps to
facilitate the collection of tax revenues from crypto assets.90 Although the
ultimate success of these efforts remains to be seen, these efforts show that
tax regulators are attempting to be proactive about addressing the issue of
crypto assets.
The relative anonymity of crypto investments poses similar challenges
for bankruptcy or insolvency systems for three closely related reasons. First,
the speculative nature of crypto assets can create a gambling mentality, with
some ordinary consumers going deeply into debt in the hopes of a big win.
For example, one early Bitcoin evangelizer went deeply into credit card debt
in order to increase his holdings.91 But given the boom-and-bust nature of
Bitcoin and other crypto assets, investors who get the timing wrong stand to
lose significant sums of money.92 Indeed, almost everyone who invested over
the nine-month period during late 2017 or early 2018 saw their holdings lose
value.93 If those investments were made with borrowed funds, then these
losses could ultimately lead to a surge in bankruptcy filings. Second, to the
extent that crypto assets create opportunities for pseudonymous investment,
debtors may be able to use these vehicles in order to shield assets from
creditors. And third, the pseudonymous nature of crypto assets complicates

88

Id. at 189 (quoted source omitted).
See Darla Mercado, The IRS Has a New Tax Form Out and Wants to Know About Your
Cryptocurrency, CNBC (Dec. 6, 2019, 1:06 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/06/the-irs-has-a-newtax-form-and-wants-to-know-about-your-cryptocurrency.html [https://perma.cc/K7J9-KRVJ].
90
For example, New York requires crypto investors to obtain a “BitLicense” that facilitates
recordkeeping and taxation. BitLicense Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y. ST. DEP’T FIN. SERVS.,
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/apps_and_licensing/virtual_currency_businesses/bitlicense_faqs
[https://perma.cc/68YA-RZDT].
91
See Popper, supra note 71, at 108 (introducing early Bitcoin evangelizer Erik Voorhees, who opted
to go deeply into credit card debt in order to devote himself full-time to developing the crypto market).
92
See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper & Su-Hyun Lee, After the Bitcoin Boom: Hard Lessons for
Cryptocurrency
Investors,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
20,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/20/technology/cryptocurrency-investor-losses.html
[https://perma.cc/2MAC-ETQF] (describing one investor whose $23,000 investment had shrunk to
$4,000 and another whose $100,000 stake had dropped by 70%).
93
Id. (“Almost all of the new customers on Coinbase and Square would be in the red if they bought
cryptocurrencies at almost any point over the last nine months and held on to them.”).
89
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trustees’ methods for avoiding preferences by making it challenging for them
to prove when a crypto transaction occurred or to whom the assets were
transferred.
Concerns that debtors can use crypto holdings to conceal assets from
creditors during a bankruptcy proceeding are not merely hypothetical. For
example, in the case of In re Schultz, the debtor failed to disclose $30,000
worth of crypto assets.94 Creditors have also begun to alert bankruptcy courts
to the possibility that debtors may be exploiting the bankruptcy system to
obtain a discharge of debts while shielding crypto assets from creditors.95
One ultimately unsuccessful example of this creditor warning occurred
in the case of In re Peeples.96 The debtors in this case had been running a
coin dealership97 in order to provide for their family of seven.98 After the
debtors filed for bankruptcy, the family’s landlords attempted to have their
unpaid rental debts of close to $50,000 declared nondischargeable.99 In the
alternative, the landlords asked the court to deny the debtors a discharge
altogether.100 Among other things, the landlords argued that the debtors had
failed to account for close to $30,000 in proceeds from their coin
dealership.101 The bankruptcy court found that the debtors’ testimony about
their business’s lack of profit from the coin dealership was not credible and
that the debtors had failed to provide satisfactory business records to explain
their transfers.102 Nonetheless, the court described the creditors’ suggestion
of debtor malfeasance as “nothing more than a tempest in a teapot.”103
Accordingly, the court concluded that the landlords had not carried their
burden of establishing that the debtors should be denied a discharge.104

94
Schultz v. Keyword Rockstar, Inc. (In re Schultz), Ch. 7 Case No. 17-01568-LA7, Adv. No. 1790126-LA, 2019 WL 2385186, at *2 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. June 4, 2019).
95
See, e.g., Scott Neuman, Rapper 50 Cent, Who Bragged About Owning Bitcoin, Now Denies It,
NPR
(Feb.
27,
2018,
5:09
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2018/02/27/589052493/rapper-50-cent-who-bragged-about-owning-bitcoin-now-denies-it
[https://perma.cc/49QS-HNT3].
96
579 B.R. 254 (Bankr. D. Utah 2017).
97
Id. at 264–65.
98
Id. at 261.
99
Id. at 259.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 280.
102
Id. at 265.
103
Id. at 259.
104
Id.
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On appeal, the landlord creditors pointed out that the missing funds may
have been invested in Bitcoin and could now be worth millions of dollars.105
However, the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) rejected this
argument as unsupported speculation.106 In a terse opinion, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals acknowledged that the bankruptcy court had erred in
concluding that the debtors had satisfied their obligation to provide sufficient
records to account for the missing funds,107 but nonetheless affirmed the
debtors’ discharge, concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its
discretion in deciding that the debtors “were not the ‘worst actors’ who
deserved the ‘extreme step’ of being denied a discharge.”108
The debtor-friendly decision in Peeples is unsurprising as the case
presented only a hypothetical risk that the debtors had funneled assets into
crypto holdings. However, the case highlights the challenges that face a
creditor who suspects that a debtor has undisclosed crypto assets. Precisely
because it is so difficult to prove that debtors have crypto holdings, we might
expect courts to respond more harshly when a debtor is actually caught redhanded in failing to disclose these assets. But this expectation does not yet
match reality. Thus far, bankruptcy courts appear willing to indulge a
debtor’s nondisclosure of crypto assets as an oversight that can be corrected
rather than treating it as a serious abuse of the bankruptcy process.
A prime example of bankruptcy courts’ debtor-friendly approach is the
Ninth Circuit BAP decision in In re Schultz.109 The debtor was a personal
coach who had created a number of educational videos and webinars.110 After
a series of disruptive life events—a fallout with his business partners, an
extended family court battle, and a house fire—the debtor filed for
bankruptcy, both individually and for his business.111 However, the debtor
was caught making two significant mistakes in his schedules. First, the
debtor failed to disclose assets, including most significantly a $30,000

105
In re Peeples, Ch. 7 Case No. 14-23970, Adv. No. 14-2236, 2018 WL 3424680, at *7 (B.A.P.
10th Cir. July 16, 2018).
106
Id.
107
In re Peeples, 779 F. App’x 561, 566 (10th Cir. 2019).
108
Id. at 567–68.
109
Ch. 7 Case No. 17-01568-LA7, Adv. No. 17-90126-LA, 2019 WL 2385186 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. June
4, 2019).
110
Id. at *1.
111
Id. at *1–2. Schultz filed a Chapter 7 petition on his own behalf and filed a Chapter 7 petition on
behalf of his business, JWS Publishing, Inc., a week later. Id.
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Bitcoin account.112 Second, the debtor had valued his email contact list at
$700, despite having bragged in a webinar that his customer list was worth
$1 million.113 The debtor’s former business partners—now creditors—asked
the court to deny his discharge, arguing that these inaccurate disclosures
represented a false oath in violation of the bankruptcy code.114 In opposing
this motion, the debtor argued that he had been in a zombie-like state when
he filed his petitions and that he had relied on his accountant as well as advice
from a friend.115
After hearing testimony from the debtor, as well as the debtor’s
accountant and therapist, the bankruptcy court rejected most of the creditors’
arguments in favor of denial of discharge regarding the Bitcoin account.116
Specifically, the court found that most of the debtor’s false oaths were not
intentional, but rather a result of “forgetfulness, lack of focus, [and] inability
to connect the dots.”117 However, the bankruptcy court reached the opposite
conclusion with respect to the low valuation that the debtor had assigned to
his email list. The court explained that the fact that the debtor had
intentionally chosen a low valuation was unreasonable and an act of
“commission rather than [of] omission.”118 Accordingly, the bankruptcy
court concluded that this false oath was a proper basis for denying the debtor
a discharge.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit BAP reversed the denial of discharge.119 In
addition to discrediting testimony regarding the potentially high value of the
email list,120 the panel focused on the discrepancy between the court’s two
findings regarding intent. The panel explained that there was no basis in the
record to reconcile the finding that the debtor did not knowingly fail to
disclose the Bitcoin account with the finding that the debtor had knowingly

112

Id.
Id. at *3.
114
See id. at *6. The creditors also moved for denial of discharge under § 727(a)(5) for inadequate
record keeping but the bankruptcy court rejected this argument. Id. at *5. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
BAP affirmed this aspect of the bankruptcy court’s decision. Id. at *10–11.
115
Id. at *4.
116
Id. at *4–6.
117
Id. at *6.
118
Id.
119
Id. at *11.
120
Id. at *8–9.
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and fraudulently undervalued the email list.121 Accordingly, the panel
concluded that the latter finding “was implausible and clearly erroneous.”122
The pro-debtor decisions in Peeples and Schultz reflect bankruptcy
courts’ nonchalant attitudes toward the risk that a debtor has used crypto
holdings to shield assets from creditors. These nonchalant attitudes stand in
stark contrast to the proactive steps taken by domestic tax regulators to
ensure that crypto investors will pay capital gains taxes on realized profits.123
One step that bankruptcy courts can adopt is to specifically ask debtors about
crypto assets, just as the IRS recently added a specific question about
cryptocurrency to federal income tax forms.124 For example, debtors should
be asked if they have ever purchased or owned cryptocurrency. Requiring a
clear “yes” or “no” answer to this question will make it less likely for a debtor
to inadvertently fail to disclose crypto assets, and this will, in turn, make it
easier for a creditor or trustee to demonstrate bad faith on the part of a debtor
who fails to disclose significant crypto assets.
Moreover, increased scrutiny from bankruptcy courts may be necessary
to deter future debtors from taking advantage of the relative anonymity of
crypto transactions. At the very least, those debtors who are caught failing to
disclose significant crypto holdings—like the debtor in Schultz—should face
serious consequences for failing to make a complete and accurate disclosure.
For example, courts could conclude that the nondisclosure of any nontrivial
amount of crypto assets, or any crypto assets directly purchased by the
debtor, should be grounds for denying a discharge. In the absence of clear
and unequivocal consequences for nondisclosure, courts may be
incentivizing debtors to use crypto holdings to at least attempt to shield assets
from liquidation. Long term, such conduct could cast doubts on the system
as a whole, which might eventually undermine the use of Chapter 7 by honest
debtors.125
As noted above, the third challenge posed by the relative anonymity of
crypto transactions relates to the trustee’s avoidance powers. In Part I, we

121

Id. at *10.
Id. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s decision is currently being appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
Keyword Rockstar, Inc. v. Schultz (In re Schultz) No. 19-60032 (9th Cir. filed July 9, 2019).
123
See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text.
124
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
125
Cf. James J. White, Abuse Prevention 2005, 71 MO. L. REV. 863, 865 (2006) (describing the fears
of opportunistic behavior by debtors that prompted Congress to amend the consumer bankruptcy code in
2005).
122
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saw one example of how crypto assets can create a wrinkle for the trustee’s
authority to avoid (or undo) transactions that occur in the months, and
sometimes even years, leading up to a bankruptcy filing.126 But anonymous
transactions portend many more challenges, particularly to a trustee’s ability
to avoid preferences under Section 547 of the bankruptcy code. This
provision gives the trustee the power to avoid any transfer that occurs within
ninety days of a bankruptcy filing.127 The recovery period extends to one year
if the counterparty is a statutorily defined “insider”128—typically a close
relative or business partner.129 The relative anonymity of crypto transactions
complicates both options for trustee recovery. A debtor who admits to having
owned crypto assets in the past may nonetheless claim to have disposed of
these assets before the preference period (and at a lower valuation), putting
trustees in the challenging position of having to prove a negative with limited
information. Moreover, even assuming that a trustee can develop evidence
to determine the timing of a particular debtor transaction, the question of
whether the transaction was conducted with an insider may be even harder
to answer due to anonymity issues concerning the transferee.130 Thus, we are
likely to see increased complications for trustees in future liquidation cases
that involve crypto assets.
In sum, the uncertain nature of crypto assets—as highlighted by the
HashFast case—coupled with the relative anonymity of these investments
have created many complications for stakeholders in the bankruptcy process.
These complications undermine the prospects for creditor recovery when
debtors choose not to be forthcoming about their crypto assets. To deal with
these issues, bankruptcy courts should consider following the IRS’s lead by
requiring specific disclosures of crypto assets. In addition, courts should
consider denying a discharge to debtors who fail to make an adequate
disclosure.

126

See supra Section I.B.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (2012).
128
Id. § 547(b)(4)(B).
129
Id. § 101(31).
130
See, e.g., Eric S. Rein & John Guzzardo, The Trustee and the Bitcoin, 37 AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
Aug. 2018, at 4 (“[M]ost virtual currencies are transferred between parties in an anonymous fashion that,
in all likelihood, make it impossible for the creditor to identify the recipient or take possession of the
transfers.”). But see Popper, supra note 71, at 84 (noting that “sophisticated network analysis” can be
used to glean personally identifying information from the blockchain).
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B. The False Facade of Liquidity
The second unique feature of crypto assets is that they often present an
illusionary facade of liquidity. From the outside, the market for crypto assets
resembles that of other market-traded assets, such as securities and
commodities. Indeed, many of these assets trade on “exchanges,” and the
current prices of these assets are usually available from a variety of internet
sources. To the extent that this superficial resemblance to a market-traded
asset suggests that a Bitcoin seller could actually obtain that current amount
in fiat currency, the picture does not always accurately reflect reality.131
Instead, early crypto investors learned the hard way that enterprises that call
themselves “exchanges” do not operate in the way that investors in other
market-based assets might expect.132
The insolvencies of crypto exchanges like Quadriga and Mt. Gox help
highlight the disconnect between the “exchange” label and the reality of how
these platforms function.133 Both the Quadriga and Mt. Gox bankruptcies
involved entities that purported to act as exchanges for Bitcoin. Although
these entities did provide customers with some of the functions of an
exchange, such as being able to transfer fiat currency for crypto assets and
vice versa, neither entity was regulated as an exchange, nor did either entity
operate strictly as a trading market for these assets. Rather, both also served
as wallets134 for many of the assets and currencies being exchanged in the
crypto market. This wallet service is the main reason why each insolvency
hit its customers much harder than did the insolvency of any exchange for

131
See generally Smith, supra note 4 (explaining that Bitcoin exchanges function as money
transmitters and depository institutions but are not regulated as closely).
132
See Alexandra Harney & Steve Stecklow, Twice Burned: How Mt. Gox’s Bitcoin Customers
Could Lose Again, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2017, 1:15 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/specialreport/bitcoin-gox/ [https://perma.cc/S324-BS98] (noting that as of late 2017, Bitcoin exchanges have
lost close to one million bitcoin valued at over $6 billion).
133
See Nikhilesh De, QuadrigaCX Officially Enters Bankruptcy with Millions Still Missing,
COINDESK (Apr. 8, 2019, 8:17 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/quadrigacx-officially-enters-bankruptcywith-millions-still-missing [https://perma.cc/Y5PK-24ZN]; Hiroko Tabuchi, In Disarray, Mt. Gox
Signals a Move Toward Liquidation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014, 10:22 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/former-bitcoin-exchange-mt-gox-set-to-liquidate-in-absenceof-revival-plan/ [https://perma.cc/5C4F-V3QW] (discussing the bankruptcy filing of Bitcoin exchange
Mt. Gox, which lost close to $500 million in cryptocurrency).
134
Levitin, supra note 4, at 315 (“A digital wallet is a computer software application that stores and
transmits payment authorization data for [a] credit or deposit account[].”); see also Ryznar, supra note
77, at 542–43 (explaining that many crypto investors keep their crypto assets remotely in wallets that are
maintained on the cloud).
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traditional market-based assets. Similarly, many other types of insolvencies
would allow consumers to recover up to $250,000 from the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC).135 When a consumer stores crypto assets in
an online wallet, however, there is no safety net in the event of an insolvency
by the wallet provider.
The circumstances surrounding both insolvencies are shrouded in
intrigue and mystery. Quadriga’s insolvency was prompted by the death of
its founder, Gerald Cotten, in 2018.136 Since late 2013, Cotten had run
Quadriga, one of Canada’s most prominent Bitcoin exchanges, from his
personal MacBook Pro.137 Purportedly, Cotten kept all of the passwords to
his customers’ accounts in encrypted files on this laptop and did not share
the encryption codes with anyone else at the company.138 After Cotten died,
customers were unable to access the wallets where their assets were stored.139
Quadriga entered insolvency proceedings in Nova Scotia with Ernst &
Young (EY) appointed as monitor.140 EY’s investigation determined that
close to $200 million in customer funds was missing—likely funneled into
Cotten’s pockets.141 EY has been able to collect some assets, including from

135
See How Are My Deposit Accounts Insured by the FDIC?, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/covered/categories.html [https://perma.cc/8RAH-G5WY] (explaining the
variety of deposit accounts, retirement accounts, and trust accounts subject to FDIC insurance).
136
See Rich, supra note 76. According to official reports, Cotten died of complications relating to
Crohn’s disease while honeymooning in India. Id. Not surprisingly, this series of events is the subject of
rampant internet speculation. Id.
137
See id.
138
See Randy Shore, Troubled Bitcoin Trader QuadrigaCX Takes Another Bizarre Turn,
VANCOUVER SUN (Feb. 1, 2019), https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/troubled-bitcoin-traderquadrigacx-takes-another-bizarre-turn/ [https://perma.cc/42WL-LNR8] (quoting an affidavit from
Cotten’s colleague which states that “[t]he laptop computer from which Gerry carried out the company’s
business is encrypted and I do not know the password or recovery key”); see also Rich, supra note 76
(describing an episode in which Cotten became hysterical upon realizing that he had left his laptop on a
yacht that was departing from the dock).
139
See Henry Mance, Left High and Dry by a Crypto Founder’s Demise, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/6f10707a-2ac1-11e9-88a4-c32129756dd8 [https://perma.cc/37S4-UKF2]
(“For years, I’ve had one thing in common with most cryptocurrency investors: I know almost nothing
about cryptocurrency. I now share something else with users of cryptocurrency trading platform
QuadrigaCX: I cannot access any cryptocurrency.”).
140
See
Message
from
QuadrigaCX,
QUADRIGACX
(Feb.
5,
2019),
https://www.quadrigacxtrustee.com/ [https://perma.cc/9T28-7JTR].
141
See Paul Vigna, Quadriga Founder Spent Client Money, Bankruptcy Monitor Says, WALL ST. J.
(Jun. 20, 2019, 6:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/quadriga-founder-spent-client-moneybankruptcy-monitor-says-11561070902 [https://perma.cc/YXF9-XZKN].
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Cotten’s widow, but customers are unlikely to recover more than a small
fraction of the lost Bitcoin value.142
The Mt. Gox insolvency also centered around the unexplained
disappearance of customer assets. Mt. Gox was founded in 2010 by Jed
McCaleb,143 who soon sold the enterprise to Mark Karpelès.144 It quickly
became the world’s leading forum for trading Bitcoin.145 Based in Japan, Mt.
Gox allowed customers to buy and sell Bitcoin, initially using McCaleb’s
PayPal account for transactions and storage.146 However, the entity was
plagued with numerous security breaches, which suggested that the nascent
exchange lacked fundamental security measures.147 Likewise, its inability to
handle high-volume trading left customers waiting extended periods for
execution, which in turn affected their returns.148 Finally, in early 2014, Mt.
Gox suddenly shut down for good,149 with Karpelès dodging a flood of
questions about whether any of its customers would recover their Bitcoin.150
Eventually, Mt. Gox’s operators revealed that 750,000 bitcoins had vanished

142
See Doug Alexander, Quadriga CEO’s Widow to Return $9 Million of Estate Assets, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 7, 2019, 4:38 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-07/quadriga-ceo-s-widowagrees-to-return-estate-assets [https://perma.cc/M29S-MHQ9].
143
See Harney & Stecklow, supra note 132 (“The Mt. Gox exchange was first launched by Jed
McCaleb, an American software engineer, in 2010.”). McCaleb was an early adopter of Bitcoin and also
an internationally renowned player of Magic: The Gathering, a card-based role play game, that in turn
inspired the acronym Mt. Gox (“Magic: The Gathering Online Exchange”). See Popper, supra note 71,
at 51. The website that hosted the exchange was originally a forum where game players could trade cards.
See Harney & Stecklow, supra note 132. However, after several frustrating months trying to run a Bitcoin
trading operation from his beach home in Costa Rica, McCaleb realized that he lacked the professional
appetite to manage the enterprise full-time. See Popper, supra note 71, at 63–65. After an early hack,
McCaleb also recognized that he lacked the expertise necessary to provide a safe venue for customers.
Id. at 67.
144
See Popper, supra note 71, at 67–68.
145
As of 2012, Mt. Gox handled approximately 80% of Bitcoin trades. See id. at 203.
146
See id. at 52.
147
See id. at 82–83 (showing Karpelès’s slow response to an early denial-of-service attack, which
suggests that the nascent exchange lacked fundamental security measures); id. at 89–91 (describing a
2011 Mt. Gox hack in which the price of Bitcoin dropped from seventeen dollars to one cent over the
course of an hour); id. at 207 (“[H]ackers showed up and staged fierce denial-of-service attacks, forcing
[Karpelès] to shut down the site altogether in the middle of the day.”).
148
See id. at 200–01 (describing Karpelès’ struggles to manage the challenges presented by Mt.
Gox’s massive growth); see also id. at 206 (describing one period of extreme volatility where trade delays
forced buyers to pay as much as $300 per coin, before cancellations drove the price down to $100 a few
hours later); id. at 307–08 (noting that by early 2014, the price of Bitcoin on Mt. Gox was almost $100
more than on any other exchange and customers were having difficulty withdrawing their funds).
149
See id. at 309.
150
See id. at 310–11.
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from Mt. Gox wallets, wiping out virtually all of its customers as well as
some of the exchange’s own holdings.151 The value of the lost crypto assets
amounted to more than $400 million152 and represented approximately 6% of
the total outstanding Bitcoin.153 Surprisingly, the price of Bitcoin remained
relatively robust in the face of this failure.154
Karpelès eventually sought insolvency protection in Japanese
bankruptcy court, where creditors—consisting mainly of Mt. Gox’s unhappy
customers—filed claims totaling close to $600 million.155 The court entered
an order of liquidation in April 2014, and appointed Japanese bankruptcy
practitioner Nobuaki Kobayashi as trustee.156 Pursuant to the cross-border
provisions of Chapter 15, a companion proceeding was opened in a
bankruptcy court in the Northern District of Texas.157
An added twist for the Mt. Gox proceedings, as compared to the
Quadriga proceedings, was that Kobayashi was able to recover around
200,000 bitcoins after Karpelès turned over additional crypto assets that had
been stashed away in Mt. Gox’s system.158 Following Japanese law, the
bankruptcy court ordered Kobayashi to liquidate the newly discovered
Bitcoin in order to pay creditor claims in fiat currency, with each Bitcoin’s
value set at the then-current price of $483.159 However, during the lengthy
process for customers to submit their claims and obtain court approval, the

151
See id. at 312. Other sources reported the loss at 850,000 bitcoins. See Jon Southurst, Mt. Gox
Files for Bankruptcy, Claims $63.6 Million Debt, COINDESK (Feb. 28, 2014, 11:33 AM),
https://www.coindesk.com/mt-gox-files-bankruptcy-claims-63-6m-debt
[https://perma.cc/TPD5ZQXM].
152
See Popper, supra note 71, at 315.
153
See Casey Doherty, Bitcoin and Bankruptcy, 33 AM. BANKR. INST. J., July 2014, at 39.
154
See Popper, supra note 71, at 315.
155
See Stan Higgins, Mt. Gox Bankruptcy Trustee Issues New Details on Creditor Reimbursement,
COINDESK (Feb. 17, 2016, 10:46 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/mt-gox-bankruptcy-details-creditorreimbursement [https://perma.cc/BR9X-S4DE].
156
See Harney & Stecklow, supra note 132.
157
In re Mt. Gox Co., Ch. 15 No. 14-31229-sgj15 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014).
158
See Jen Wieczner, Mt. Gox and the Surprising Redemption of Bitcoin’s Biggest Villain, FORTUNE
(Apr.
19,
2018,
6:30
AM),
https://fortune.com/longform/bitcoin-mt-gox-hack-karpeles/
[https://perma.cc/QNT4-DUN4] (describing how Karpelès eventually found coins that had been stashed
away in Mt. Gox’s system discovery of the additional coins).
159
See Harney & Stecklow, supra note 132 (explaining that the Japanese court fixed the approved
claims to the value of Bitcoin as of April 2014, which totaled approximately $400 million).
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price of Bitcoin rose to eighteen times its 2014 value.160 Continued
liquidation promised a massive payday for Karpelès, who would receive any
surplus after customers had been repaid at the depressed price of $483 per
Bitcoin.161 Not surprisingly, Mt. Gox’s customers protested, arguing that they
should be paid back in Bitcoin.162 However, Kobayashi’s hands were tied by
the Japanese legal process, and he proceeded to liquidate close to $400
million in Bitcoin.163 As the liquidation proceeded, coin prices sunk:
Bitcoin’s price had peaked in December 2017 at an all-time high of over
$20,000 per coin; then, as Kobayashi sought to exchange the Bitcoin for fiat
currency, the price of Bitcoin dropped by half.164 Kobayashi’s single biggest
transfer of Bitcoin took place on February 5, 2018, which in turn marked a
long-term low point for Bitcoin’s valuation at just over $6,000—less than a
third of its price just two months earlier.165
Due to this extreme volatility in the price of Bitcoin, the total value lost
over the course of liquidation dwarfed the total amount of creditors’
approved claims. The fact that Karpelès received some surplus after the
repayments at $483 per Bitcoin was the final straw for creditors, who
successfully organized to put pressure on Kobayashi to halt the Bitcoin
sales.166 In June 2018, Mt. Gox’s liquidation was converted to a rehabilitation

160
Adrianne Jeffries, Inside the Bizarre Upside-Down Bankruptcy of Mt. Gox, VERGE (Mar. 22,
2018, 10:30 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/22/17151430/bankruptcy-mt-gox-liabilities-bitcoin
[https://perma.cc/94XN-GYYR].
161
See id.; Oscar Williams-Grut, ‘This Is Horse S---’: Bitcoin Traders Are Angry That Mt. Gox’s
Crypto Stash Is Being ‘Dumped’ on the Market, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 8, 2018),
https://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-price-traders-angry-over-mt-gox-trustees-bitcoin-sales-20183/?international=true&r=UK [https://perma.cc/N6KT-44X8].
162
As one creditor complained, “Those of us who were burned by this are now permanently locked
into that depressed price.” See Harney & Stecklow, supra note 132 (quoting software developer Aaron
Gutman, who lost 464 bitcoins in the hack).
163
Id.
164
See Williams-Grut, supra note 161.
165
See id.
166
See Jeffries, supra note 160 (describing the formation of Mt. Gox Legal, led by Andy Pag).
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proceeding, which meant that creditors could opt to be repaid in Bitcoin.167
The price of Bitcoin promptly rebounded.168
The Mt. Gox liquidation in particular carries an important lesson for
insolvency systems dealing with crypto assets: forced liquidation of crypto
assets is a risky process. Not only does forced liquidation often drive down
creditor recovery (a problem that occurs with many types of assets169), but it
can also drive down the value for other investors in the crypto asset at
issue.170 Moreover, unlike forced sales of other assets in bankruptcy
proceedings, such as real estate, the loss in value to other investors has ripple
effects globally. A global problem calls for a global solution, so insolvency
systems should be mindful of the need for uniformity. That said, requiring
creditors to accept payment in Bitcoin seems to be the fairest system, both
from the standpoint of creditors and from the perspective of coinvestors who
would otherwise face losses from large-scale liquidation. Creditors who are
paid in crypto assets will then be on even footing with other investors,
regardless of whether they choose to remain invested in the crypto asset.
C. Avoiding Opportunistic Behaviors Enabled by High Volatility
A third problem that arises with crypto assets is the risk that creditors
or debtors will exploit bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings in order to
capitalize on the high volatility of crypto assets. Although such risks exist
for other assets, the potential for opportunistic behavior is exacerbated by the

167

See Kosaku Narioka, Court Blocks Payday for Chief of Bankrupt Mt. Gox Bitcoin Exchange,
WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2018, 8:23 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/court-blocks-payday-for-chief-ofbankrupt-mt-gox-bitcoin-exchange-1529929409 [https://perma.cc/6DZZ-6F5N].
168
The story for Mt. Gox creditors does not yet have a happy ending: rehabilitation proceedings have
since ground to a halt, due to a massive $16 billion suit filed by Coinlab. See Nikhilesh De, Advocate for
Mt Gox Creditors Quits, Saying Bitcoin Payouts Could Take Years, COINDESK (Apr. 9, 2019, 9:16 PM),
https://www.coindesk.com/coinlabs-mt-gox-claim-may-hold-up-payouts-for-another-2-years
[https://perma.cc/VZ8D-GAVM]. After successfully leading the creditor uprising that would allow
repayment in Bitcoin, Pag quit the fight in early 2019 and sold off his claims for quick cash. Id.
169
See generally Thomas W. Mitchell, Stephen Malpezzi & Richard K. Green, Forced Sale Risk:
Class, Race, and the ‘Double Discount,’ 37 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 589, 601–03 (2010) (“In many areas of
the law it is well accepted that an asset sold at a forced sale will likely sell for a price significantly below
the asset’s fair market value.”).
170
See Doherty, supra note 153, at 38–39 (“[D]ue to Bitcoin’s finite and largely unregulated
existence, its supply can be easily affected large-scale by outside events, such as the Mt. Gox
[liquidation] . . . .”).
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rising use of crypto assets as collateral.171 In particular, the extreme volatility
of crypto assets means that there are more opportunities for lenders who were
previously fully secured to suddenly find themselves undersecured. As
explained in Section I.A, a consumer debtor might then be able to use the
tools of Chapter 13 to strip down the lender’s lien to the current value of the
collateral. A business debtor could achieve the same result using the tools of
Chapter 11. Such opportunistic behavior could take other forms as well.
However, this Section focuses primarily on the risk of opportunistic behavior
by the debtor.
To explore the risks that we might see from crypto investors, we can
consider behaviors that have already played out in real estate markets. This
comparison is helpful from a policy perspective because the modern
bankruptcy code, as well as the court decisions applying it, provide tools
intended to prevent stakeholders from manipulating the volatility of the real
estate market.172 However, these tools do not work for crypto assets as the
volatility risks affect both the individual debtor–creditor relationships and
the rest of the market for crypto assets. These impacts illustrate that there is
an even stronger case for congressional intervention in crypto than there was
for real estate.
In the business reorganization context, the risk of opportunistic
behavior by debtors arose primarily from reorganization provisions that
authorized debtors who obtained secured loans at a time when the collateral
was highly valued to then use the bankruptcy code to reorganize if the value
of the collateral fell, even temporarily. Under this scenario, any rise in value
following a discharge would represent a windfall to the debtor. This strategy
is, in a nutshell, “the Pine Gate problem” that Congress sought to fix in 1978
when it revamped the bankruptcy code.173

171
See Robinson, supra note 7. Various lenders have sprung up to take advantage of the consumer
market for crypto-backed loans, including Celsius, Coinloan, and SALT Lending. See 8 Cryptocurrency
Lending Platforms, PANORAMA CRYPTO (Oct. 3, 2019), https://panoramacrypto.com/8-cryptocurrencylending-platforms/ [https://perma.cc/88G6-VNCH].
172
See Tabb, supra note 46, at 118 (explaining how, in the wake of Pine Gate, secured creditors
went “straight to the legislature” and obtained “the kinds of protections they wanted against the sort of
low-ball cram-down ignominy that Pine Gate wrought”).
173
See generally Douglas G. Baird, Remembering Pine Gate, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 5, 8 (2004)
(referring to a debtor’s once unchecked ability to use bankruptcy to write down secured debt as the “Pine
Gate problem”).
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Professor Douglas Baird has described the circumstances surrounding
the Pine Gate problem in colorful detail,174 but the basic facts are as follows:
the Pine Gate bankruptcy involved a debtor who had borrowed $1.45 million
to build an apartment complex.175 The complex was not nearly as profitable
as projected, and the secured lender eventually sought to foreclose by
arguing for a low valuation of the asset.176 But, using the debtor-friendly tools
of the prior version of the bankruptcy code, Pine Gate’s developers were able
to use reorganization proceedings not only to retain the apartment complex,
but also to write down the loan significantly.177 The developers emerged from
bankruptcy lien-free by paying the formerly secured lender $1.032 million—
barely two-thirds of the amount the lender had advanced just a few years
earlier.178
The Pine Gate decision quickly became infamous in bankruptcy
circles,179 due in part to the influence of William Norton, Jr., the bankruptcy
judge who put his stamp of approval on the debtor’s plan.180 Judge Norton’s
decision was widely criticized for striking the wrong balance: allowing the
debtor to capture all of the benefits of any future appreciation of the
apartment complex, while imposing the consequences of any undervaluation
on the lender.181 Indeed, Congress expressly cited the Pine Gate decision
when revamping the bankruptcy code.182
In his article, Professor Baird identified three statutory tools that
Congress enacted to prevent future debtors from similarly exploiting the
volatility and valuation problems that arise in the real estate lending market:

174

See id. at 6–8.
Id. at 7.
176
Id.
177
See In re Pine Gate Assocs., 1977 WL 373416 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 15, 1977).
178
See id. at *1.
179
Professor Charles Tabb uses the adjective “notorious” to describe Judge Norton’s decision in Pine
Gate. See Tabb, supra note 46, at 117.
180
See generally Gerald K. Smith, Tribute to William L. Norton, Jr., 4 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER,
Apr. 2002, at 1 (“Many of us first became familiar with Judge Norton as a result of his Pine Gate decision
[in which he] breathed life into a little used reorganization tool.”). Among other achievements, Judge
Norton authored the leading U.S. bankruptcy treatise, Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice, and founded
the Norton Institutes for Bankruptcy. See generally About Us, NORTON INSTS. ON BANKR. L.,
https://www.nortoninstitutes.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/NDG7-YT8D] (explaining the history of the
institute and its founder, Judge Norton).
181
See Michael E. Rubinger & Gary W. Marsh, Sale of Collateral Plans Which Deny a Nonrecourse
Undersecured Creditor the Right to Credit Bid: Pine Gate Revisited, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 265, 270 (1993).
182
See 124 CONG. REC. 28258 (1978) (statement of Sen. Malcolm Wallop).
175
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Section 1111(b)(1), which allows a lender to turn nonrecourse debt into
recourse debt; Section 1111(b)(2), which allows a lender to treat the entire
amount of its allowed claim as secured; and Section 1129(b)(2), which
ensures that when a plan is confirmed over a lender’s objection, the lender
will nonetheless receive the “indubitable equivalent” of the value of its
collateral.183
These statutory responses to the Pine Gate problem give secured
creditors more tools to protect themselves from debtors who use volatility
opportunistically. In particular, these statutory tools prevent secured
creditors from being at a systemic disadvantage relative to other creditors, or
to the debtor itself, due to fluctuations in the value of the collateral.
Importantly, these tools work most effectively if the secured creditor makes
an accurate assessment about the current and future value of the collateral.
Of course, creating incentives for accurate valuation does not always ensure
that the valuation will be accurate. A creditor’s failure to make an accurate
valuation, if accepted by the court, could still result in forced sales that
destroy value, thereby inflicting external costs on the broader market.
This last point is not a significant problem in the real estate market,
because the fallout from secured creditors’ suboptimal choices is generally
localized. For example, the collapse of the savings and loan industry in 1984
prompted a wave of bankruptcy filings involving single asset real estate
ventures.184 The surge began in Texas and then extended to nearby regions.185
The Northeast experienced its own surge, as did California and Florida.186
The relatively localized nature of this crisis allowed local courts to develop
their own approaches to the flood of cases.187 However, the shortcomings of
these statutory fixes may become more apparent in the crypto asset market,
where—as the Mt. Gox trustee demonstrated—untimely liquidations based
on pessimism about future value can have negative effects that are felt
around the globe.188 The risk for opportunistic behavior by creditors is also

183

See Baird, supra note 173, at 9–10. In the interest of concision, this Essay will not attempt to
provide a detailed explanation of these concepts, but interested readers may find Professor Baird’s article
quite helpful to explain how these tools work in practice.
184
See Hon. Leif M. Clark, Chapter 11—Does One Size Fit All?, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 167,
179–80 (1996).
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
See id.
188
See supra text accompanying notes 97–110.
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possible, particularly if the creditors are in a position to benefit from
volatility and can use the statutory tools cynically to create price swings.189
Finally, the risk of opportunistic behaviors is not limited to Chapter 11
debtors: consumer debtors may be able to use Chapter 13 to reduce the value
of liens on crypto collateral.190 Once again, a comparison to the real estate
market provides helpful context. Prior to 1992, consumer debtors attempted
to use the bankruptcy code to strip down liens on home mortgages when real
estate values had fallen.191 The Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Dewsnup
v. Timm put a halt to this practice.192 Over a sharp dissent from Justice
Scalia,193 the majority conceded that rejecting the debtor’s straightforward
application of the lien-stripping provisions of the bankruptcy code was “not
without its difficulty.”194 However, the majority explained that the “windfall”
for a debtor who was allowed to use lien stripping in this manner would
upend the home mortgage market.195 Surely Congress could not have
intended such a significant outcome.196
The Dewsnup decision has been widely criticized by courts and
commentators alike.197 These critiques raise doubts about whether
Dewsnup’s logic, dependent as it is on the reliance interests of home
mortgage lenders, would be extended to lenders in the relatively new crypto

189
Savvy hedge fund investors are particularly adept at identifying opportunities to profit from
volatility. See, e.g., Dana Hull & Pierre Paulden, Soros Finds Another Route to Profit from Tesla’s
Volatile
Stock,
BLOOMBERG
(May
18,
2018,
12:35
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-18/soros-finds-another-route-to-profit-from-tesla-svolatile-stock [https://perma.cc/V5AY-GDSZ] (explaining why Soros sees asset volatility as “a recipe
for making money”).
190
See 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (2012).
191
See, e.g., Gaglia v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 889 F.2d 1304, 1306 (3d Cir. 1989) (“The
majority of the bankruptcy and district courts that have considered this issue agree that the language of
Sec. 506 allows a Chapter 7 debtor to void liens secured by property that is not administered.”).
192
502 U.S. 410 (1992).
193
Id. at 420–36.
194
Id. at 417.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
See, e.g., Bank of Am., N.A. v. Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. 1995, 2000, n.† (2015) (“From its inception,
Dewsnup . . . has been the target of criticism.”); In re Woolsey, 696 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2012); Mary
Josephine Newborn, Undersecured Creditors in Bankruptcy: Dewsnup, Nobelman, and the Decline of
Priority, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 547, 581–92 (1993). In the Woolsey case, then-Judge Gorsuch described
Dewsnup as “a gnarled bramble blocking what should be an open path” leading to “a topsy-turvy result.”
In re Woolsey, 696 F.3 at 1278, 1273.
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collateral lending market.198 Thus, in the future, we may see debtors using
bankruptcy opportunistically to try to strip down liens on crypto collateral,
creating another round of valuation and statutory interpretation problems for
bankruptcy courts.
D. Planning Around Future Jurisdictional Headaches
A final feature unique to crypto assets is the wrench that these assets
throw into traditional analysis of jurisdiction. In particular, crypto assets pose
a new complication when a court’s authority to dispose of certain assets
depends on in rem jurisdiction: namely, how to determine the location of an
asset that arguably exists only in digital form. Already we see regulators and
lawmakers around the world approaching these issues differently. Under
some proposals, the location of the key that unlocks the digital asset is the
hook for in rem jurisdiction.199 In others, regulators have focused on the
location of the server on which the asset is stored.200 Under this approach, to
determine jurisdiction over a wallet-stored crypto asset, we would look to
the location of the server for the entity that provides the wallet services.
Finally, some commentators have argued that jurisdictional concepts are
meaningless because these assets exist both nowhere and everywhere.201

198

See Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he
legislative history indicat[es] that favorable treatment of residential mortgagees was intended to
encourage the flow of capital into the home lending market”).
199
See, e.g., Dillon Collett, Cryptocurrency Assets Under Insolvency and Personal Property Security
Law,
AIRD
BERLIS
(Feb.
15,
2018),
https://www.airdberlis.com/insights/publications/publication/cryptocurrency-assets-under-insolvencyand-personal-property-security-law [https://perma.cc/3LVP-ABX6] (suggesting that obtaining the
debtor’s cooperation to take possession of the private key might avoid an otherwise “lengthy and tedious”
process, especially if the debtor has stored the private key offline).
200
See, e.g., Dealing With Cryptocurrency in a Bankrupt Estate, AUSTL. FIN. SECURITY AUTHORITY,
https://www.afsa.gov.au/insolvency/i-am-practitioner/dealing-cryptocurrency-bankrupt-estate
[https://perma.cc/97KW-QARS] (explaining that the trustee should immediately gain control of the
digital key to unlock the crypto asset and should consider using UNCITRAL if the key is stored in an
extraterritorial wallet).
201
For an early articulation of this view, see, for example, Allan R. Stein, The Unexceptional
Problem of Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 32 INT’L L. 1167, 1170 (1998) (arguing that the fact that actions
in cyberspace can have global effects “requires the abandonment, or at least compromise, of sovereign
claims” to jurisdiction). Japan’s approach seems to fit into this last category. See generally Akihiro Shiba,
What Tokyo’s Mt Gox Ruling Means for Bitcoin in Japan, COINDESK (Aug. 14, 2015, 3:25 PM),
https://www.coindesk.com/what-tokyos-mt-gox-ruling-means-for-bitcoin-in-japan
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Interestingly, the current U.S. approach most closely resembles this
third option, in that we define our bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction as being
coextensive with the reach of 11 U.S.C. § 541, which defines property of the
estate as “property, wherever located and by whomever held.”202 But this
approach may eventually create conflicts in cross-border cases, where
Chapter 15 requires U.S. courts to defer to proceedings that occur in “the
country where the debtor has the center of its main interests”203—also known
as the COMI principle, which guides European bankruptcy jurisprudence.204
Although current approaches to cross-border insolvencies have generally
promoted comity and function over strict adherence to form,205 jurisdictional
skirmishes have already limited the extraterritorial application of U.S.
judgments in some instances.206 If other, more favorable jurisdictions opt to
take a more restrictive approach to in rem jurisdiction over crypto assets, we
may see similar skirmishes in future large-scale bankruptcies involving
widely held crypto assets.207

[https://perma.cc/EYE4-XE93] (explaining why a Japanese court rejected a Mt. Gox customer’s
argument that his Bitcoin was an object of ownership that the court should order returned: Article 85 of
the Japanese civil code requires that “an object of ownership must occupy a portion of space” whereas
crypto assets merely represent contractual rights and obligations).
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See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012).
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See id. § 1502(4) (defining “foreign main proceeding”); id. § 1517(a)–(b) (stating the standard
for recognition of a foreign proceeding); see also id. § 1508 (“In interpreting this chapter, the court shall
consider its international origin, and the need to promote an application of this chapter that is consistent
with the application of similar statutes adopted by foreign jurisdictions.”).
204
See Bob Wessels & Ilya Kokorin, COMI Under European and American Insolvency Law,
OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2019/02/comiunder-european-and-american-insolvency-law [https://perma.cc/72HC-HD37].
205
See generally UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION 3 (2014) (“The
purpose of this Law is to . . . promote the objectives of: [c]ooperation between the courts and other
competent authorities of this State and foreign States involved in cases of cross-border insolvency; . . .
[p]rotection and maximization of the value of the debtor’s assets; and [f]acilitation of the rescue of
financially troubled businesses, thereby protecting investment and preserving employment.”).
206
See, e.g., Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46 (appeal taken from Eng.) (refusing to enforce
a U.S. judgment in accordance with Chapter 15 due to the failure to satisfy local personal jurisdiction
standards); see also Osterman & Dandeneau, supra note 11, at 189–91 (discussing cross-border
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III. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT WAIT-AND-SEE APPROACH
As this Essay shows, bankruptcy systems have yet to forge a cogent and
comprehensive approach for how to manage crypto assets. One explanation
for the agnostic approach in cases like HashFast,208 and the current void of
concrete guidance, is that bankruptcy courts and litigants alike would prefer
to wait until other authorities have had a full opportunity to characterize and
regulate this asset. But this wait-and-see approach is a mistake for three
reasons.
First, the speculative nature of crypto assets creates a potent risk of a
future market collapse, which would likely lead to a surge in bankruptcy
filings. To see how this risk might play out for bankruptcy, we can look to
the collapse of the real estate market in the early 1980s.209 Single-asset real
estate filings surged, overwhelming bankruptcy courts.210 This wave of
filings in turn prompted a variety of inconsistent and arguably inadequate
responses, including judicial work-arounds that had no basis in the text of
the bankruptcy code.211 A crypto market failure could have a similarly
detrimental effect on bankruptcy, with overwhelmed and underprepared
bankruptcy courts aiming for quick dispositions as opposed to thoughtful
decisions that guarantee consistency or that make sense from a long-term
policy perspective. Moreover, the global nature of crypto assets practically
ensures that the fallout will be far more widespread than it would be with
other assets.
Second, there is little upside to a wait-and-see approach, because
waiting for other authorities to act is unlikely to yield a coherent framework
that would allow bankruptcy courts to handle these assets efficiently.212 To
the contrary, legal developments surrounding crypto assets look more like
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See supra Part I.
See generally Clark, supra note 184, at 179 (explaining that bankruptcy serves as “a ready device
with which to blunt the worst effects” of a market collapse).
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See id. (explaining that the number of single-asset Chapter 11 filings surged from dozens to
thousands after the speculative real estate bubble burst).
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Id. at 179–80 (explaining that the variety of approaches and lack of consistency in the single-asset
real estate cases “skew[ed] the law” and “may have rendered [Chapter 11] less of a fit” for other types of
debtors).
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See, e.g., Lemchuk, supra note 3, at 323 (“[W]hile government actors have been stepping into the
virtual currency world and trying to set its borders, the assortment of definitions and regulations seem
more to confuse than clarify.”).
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regulatory power grabs than an effort to provide a meaningful framework.213
Moreover, as Part II shows, crypto assets have unique features that create
idiosyncratic problems for bankruptcy. Accordingly, waiting on other actors
would likely leave the bankruptcy system with a patchwork approach that
still forces difficult and uncertain choices about how to handle crypto assets
in bankruptcy proceedings. Because crypto assets create unique problems in
the bankruptcy context, bankruptcy will likely need its own framework to
properly address how these assets should function within bankruptcy.214
Third, a wait-and-see approach could inhibit the development of
reliable crypto enterprises here in the United States, which in turn could
eventually limit U.S. courts’ ability to take meaningful action in bankruptcies
and reorganizations that involve crypto assets. Without any real certainty or
even guidance about how crypto assets will be treated under Title 11 of the
United States Code, sophisticated players may be tempted to look elsewhere
for a framework that provides more clarity (or, from a cynical perspective,
lax regulation).215 Moreover, depending on how the jurisdictional issues
discussed in Section II.D play out, the COMI principles followed by the
European Union could eventually become a barrier to U.S. courts seeking to
exercise jurisdiction over digital assets held on foreign servers.216 Large-scale
cases involving crypto assets would more likely be filed in jurisdictions that
have a stronger COMI claim, and U.S. courts may be shut out of this arena
entirely.
CONCLUSION
The possibility that the United States will be shut out of the crypto
bankruptcy arena is an important consideration for the country, one that
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raises questions about its continued leadership role, not just in insolvency
but in the future global economy. Although myths of American
exceptionalism may at times overstate the case, the United States has long
been recognized as a global leader in corporate reorganization.217 Though the
U.S. system may not always get the right answer, our decades of experience
with a time-tested framework for Chapter 11 reorganizations serves as a
useful base model that other countries can choose either to mirror or to
deviate from. Either way, the choice is both conscious and informed.
However, if the United States’ insolvency systems continue to ignore
the mounting issues presented by crypto assets, we may see other
jurisdictions stepping into that void and positioning themselves as the base
model for handling crypto assets. Perhaps that is for the best, but at the very
least, the possibility of a future in which U.S. bankruptcy courts are relegated
to second-tier status ought to be a conscious and informed choice. This is
exactly why the United States bankruptcy system’s lack of focus on crypto
assets is so troubling: without some centralized effort to address the
particular challenges associated with crypto assets, we may find ourselves
with no choices left at all.
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